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present in this case. Winkler had no reason to believe
that the bakery would modify the proofer in such a
dangerous manner and had no actual knowledge of other
bakeries in the industry making smiliar alterations.

Winkler's warnings adequate
The court held that both the instruction manual
warning and the warning on the proofer itself were
adequate. Thus, the court concluded that Winkler was
entitled to rely on the bakery to pass along its warnings.

The threshold question is whether the "warnings made
the product safe at the time it left the manufacturer's
control." Ferguson, at 1226-27. Winkler met the
threshhold by including two warnings regarding
reaching into the moving machine.
Editor'sNote: The Supreme Court of the United
States denied writ of certiorari on October 21, 1996.
Fergusonv. Winkler GMBH & Co. KG, 117 S. Ct. 360
(U.S., Oct. 21, 1996) (No. 96-289).

Acquisition of credit report did not violate Fair
Credit Reporting Act (FCRA)
by PatrickMcGovern
In Korotki v. Attorney Services
Corp., Inc., 931 E Supp. 1269 (D.
Md. 1996), the United States
District Court for the District of
Maryland held that the acquisition of
a credit report to obtain an alternate
address at which to serve legal
papers did not violate the Fair Credit
Reporting Act ("FCRA").

Credit report provides
address
The plaintiff, Abraham Korotki
("Korotki"), entered into a real
estate development contract with
Baltimore County. As part of the
project, Baltimore County awarded a
contract to Angelozzi Brothers, Inc.
("Angelozzi") to install roads and
utility mains at the development site.
While the construction was underway, Angelozzi submitted an invoice
for $6,000 to Korotki for compaction services it had performed.
Korotki refused to pay, claiming that
Angelozzi's original contract with
Baltimore County required
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Angelozzi to perform the services
and that Angelozzi had failed to
appropriately perform the work.
Angelozzi then hired a law firm,
Thomas, Ronald & Cooper
("TRC"), to collect the disputed
debt. An attorney at the firm,
Schmitt, enlisted the aid of Attorney
Services Corporation ("ASC") to
post the development property with
a notice of a mechanic's lien. Instead
of posting the notice on the development property, however, ASC posted
it at Korotki's personal residence.
By the time anyone discovered the
mistake, the 90-day notice period for
establishing the mechanic's lien had
expired.
Schmitt then instructed ASC to
serve Korotki personally with the
mechanic's lien papers. However,
ASC was unable to serve Korotki at
the addresses which ASC had
available. At that point, ASC,
without any specific authorization
from Korotki or Schmitt, requested a
credit report from Equifax seeking
to obtain an alternate address for

Korotki. ASC transmitted a copy of
the report to Schmitt, who claimed
that neither he nor his law firm used
the report for any purpose.

Violation of FCRA alleged
After learning that ASC had
obtained his credit report, Korotki
filed suit against ASC, Schmitt, and
TRC, alleging willful and negligent
violations of the FCRA, 15 U.S.C. §
1681, the Maryland Consumer
Credit Reporting Agencies Act
("CCRAA") and invasion of
privacy. Korotki did not allege that
any of the defendants actually used
the credit report for any purpose.
The defendants, in turn, filed
motions for summary judgment.
In deciding the defendants'
motions for summary judgment, the
district court addressed four issues:
1) whether the credit report ASC
obtained was a "consumer report" to
which the FCRA applies; 2) if the
credit report was a consumer report,
what did the FCRA require of the
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defendants; 3) whether the defendants failed to comply with those
requirements; and 4) whether the
defendants were liable under the
plaintiff's state law claims.

Court finds FCRA
applicable
The court first reviewed the
definition of a "consumer report" as
provided in 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(d).
The court noted that the definition
hinged upon whether the motive of
the credit reporting agency in
attaining the report was proper under
the statute, e.g., whether the report
became a factor in establishing the
consumer's eligibility for credit,
insurance or employment. In this
case, the report by Equifax included
a copy of the FCRA and information
about Korotki's assets and liabilities.
Based on this evidence, the court
found that when Equifax collected
credit information on Korotki, it
believed that the information would
be used for a proper purpose under
the FCRA. Thus, the court considered the report a consumer report, as
defined in the statute, and found the
FCRA applicable to its use.
Once finding that the FCRA
applied to Korotki's situation, the
court examined the statute's legislative history. The court explained that
Congress intended the statute to
protect consumers from inaccurate
or arbitrary information in a
consumer report, while allowing the
free flow of information about a
consumer. Korotki alleged that the
main purpose of the statute is the
protection of a consumer's privacy.
The court rejected this contention,
noting that Congress balanced
privacy concerns against the
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informational needs of the business
community in enacting the statute.
Under the statute, a consumer
reporting agency may furnish a
consumer report without the
consumer's authorization to a third
party who meets one of the five
purposes listed in § 168 1b(3). The
court viewed two of these purposes
as pertinent to the case at bar- 1) the
agency has reason to believe that the
party seeks the information in
connection with a credit transaction
involving the consumer and 2) the
party otherwise has a legitimate
business need for the information in
connection with a transaction
involving the consumer. In addition,
the court concluded that users of
credit information, as well as
consumer reporting agencies, must
comply with § 1681b.

Defendants had legitimate

purpose to obtain credit
report
The court explained that Korotki
would have to show that the
defendants lacked a permissible
purpose in obtaining the credit
report to prove a violation of the
FCRA. The court found that the only
purpose the defendants had was to
obtain an alternate address at which
to serve Korotki. According to the
court, this purpose did not violate
the FCRA because the defendants
possessed a legitimate business need
for the information in connection
with a business transaction involving the consumer. The court reasoned that the defendants had a
permissible business purpose related
to obtaining information in connection with a credit transaction
involving a consumer even under the

narrowest interpretation of §
168 lb(3). Correspondingly, the
court found evidence to suggest that
Korotki entered the transaction
personally, as a consumer. For these
reasons, the court granted summary
judgment in favor of the defendants.

Same standard for users
In rendering its decision, the
court also articulated a standard for
courts to determine whether a user
has shown that he or she possesses a
permissible purpose under § 1681b.
The court explained that the
standard should be the same one
which applies to a consumer
reporting agency:.a user must have a
reasonable belief that a permissible
purpose exists. Applying this
standard, the court found that
Angelozzi, as a user, possessed a
reasonable belief that a business
transaction occurred involving
Korotki. Accordingly, the court held
that Angelozzi was not liable under
the FCRA.

Other arguments rejected
Korotki advanced several other
arguments in support of his FCRA
claim, all of which the court
ultimately rejected. First, Korotki
alleged that ASC did not have a
permissible purpose under the
FCRA because no one asked ASC to
collect the debt. The court rejected
this argument, holding that no
material distinction existed between
the services for which Schmitt hired
ASC and the attempt to collect the
debt.
Next, Korotki argued that if the
court ruled in favor of the defendants, such a ruling would allow any
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claimant asserting a monetary claim
to obtain a person's consumer report
without violating the FCRA.
Rejecting this assertion, the court
explained that a monetary claim is
distinguishable from collecting a
debt because the latter involves a
credit transaction.
Third, Korotki argued that ASC
could have obtained the additional
address at which to serve Korotki by
running a less intrusive credit check.
Again, the court rejected this
argument, noting that the FCRA
does not limit an authorized user's

access to credit information.
Finally, the court rejected
Korotki's argument that the acquisition of his credit report was frivolous because the notice period for
the mechanics lien had expired. The
court held that Schmitt acted
reasonably in his client's interest and
that Korotki failed to present any
evidence of bad faith.
In addition to his claim under the
FCRA, Korotki brought state law
claims pursuant to the CCRAA and
common law invasion of privacy.
With respect to Korotki's CCRAA

claims, the court found that the
FCRA and the CCRAA are virtually
identical. Thus, given the court's
dismissal of the FCRA claim, the
court concluded that the defendants
did not violate the CCRAA either.
Finally, with respect to Korotki's
claim of invasion of privacy, the
court held that because the FCRA
authorized the defendants' actions, a
finding of an invasion of privacy
would be inconsistent with the
FCRA, and thus, preempted by the
FCRA.

Batch code obliteration violates trademark and
unfair competition laws by causing "likelihood of
consumer confusion"
by CatherineMoore
In John PaulMitchell Systems v. Pete-N-Larry's
Inc., 862 F. Supp. 1020 (W.D.N.Y. 1994), the Federal
District Court for the Western District of New York
found that a retailer's obliteration of batch codes from
bottles of hair care products resulted in consumer
confusion sufficient to constitute a potential violation of
the Federal Trademark Act of 1946 and New York's
unfair competition laws.

Hair care products sold without
authorization
John Paul Mitchell Systems ("JPMS"), the manufacturer of the Paul Mitchell line of hair care products,
authorizes the distribution of its products exclusively to
professional hair salons and stylists. JPMS limits
product availability to ensure that consumers have the
opportunity to seek professional advice for questions
concerning the appropriate selection and proper usage of
Paul Mitchell products. JPMS maintains that the quality
of its product suffers if consumers do not have access to
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professional consultations. Consequently, JPMS does
not authorize the sale or distribution of Paul Mitchell
products to retail stores.
The defendants, Pete-N-Larry's Inc. and several other
retail stores, admitted that they sold Paul Mitchell
products without authorization. The plaintiffs, JPMS and
its regional distributor, alleged that the defendant
retailers wrongfully obtained the products and physically obliterated the batch codes from the bottles "in
concert with numerous, diverse, and unknown others."
Batch codes are required by federal and state laws and
are necessary to identify specific products in the event of
a product recall. JPMS contractually prohibits its
authorized distributors from selling Paul Mitchell
products "to any person they know or have reason to
suspect intends to sell the product to someone else."
JPMS further alleged that the defendant retailers
denied access to professional consults to those consumers who purchased Paul Mitchell products. Additionally,
JPMS contended that the defendant retailers failed to
make such consumers the "conspicuously" aware that
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